同事Haytham博士有关疆独(东突厥伊斯兰教政党）与敘利亞新政权的关系和困境。这屬少有的分析，特别是作者熟悉中东各方势力的情况。他在我们们的研究院内是专研中亞南亚中东小组的成员。小组每月出版月刊分析区内情况，作为研究院重要课题的出发點。香港及国内少有这样深入的区域研究。我们希望能有所贡献，推动国人对这个全球最具地缘战略地区的认识与研究。

The Fate of the Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria
By Haytham Mouzahem, Research Fellow, NSBRRI, Hong Kong Chu Hai College

 
Since the beginning of the Syrian war, the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), also known as the East Turkistan Movement, has been one of the most influential non-Syrian actors in the armed insurgency, particularly in the northwest of the country. With the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime at the end of 2014 and Syria's entry into a new regime led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, numerous questions arose regarding the fate of this foreign jihadist force and its ability to integrate or become a political pressure point for the new government.

After the fall of the previous Syrian regime on December 8, 2014, foreign fighter groups such as the Turkistan Islamic Party, Ajnad al-Sham (Chechnya), and Ajnad al-Kavkaz were an integral part of the armed opposition's "Military Operations Room," led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. In his first statement on the issue of foreign fighters in the country, the Syrian interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, said that those who contributed to the overthrow of the Assad regime "deserve to be rewarded." In a meeting with journalists in mid-January, al-Sharaa explained that the crimes of the previous regime had necessitated reliance on foreign fighters, who, he argued, deserved to be rewarded for their support of the Syrian people. He hinted at the possibility of granting them Syrian citizenship, a suggestion that sparked widespread debate at the time.

It wasn't long before the new Syrian administration announced the appointment of a number of these fighters to high-ranking military positions, ranging from brigadier general to colonel, in the new Syrian army. Among the most prominent were Abdul Rahman Hussein al-Khatib, a Jordanian promoted to brigadier general; Alaa Muhammad Abdul Baqi, an Egyptian; Abdul Aziz Dawood Khodabardi, a Uyghur Turkestani from China; Mulan Terson Abdul Samad (Tajiki); Omar Muhammad Jaftchi Mukhtar (Turkish); Abdul Bashari Khattab (Albanian); and Zanoor al-Basr Abdul Hamid Abdullah al-Dagestani, commander of the "Army of Emigrants and Supporters."

These foreign fighters represent both a source of complexity and a potential solution for Syria's future. A former leader in Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) stated that the Sharia administration would not object to complying with the US administration's condition, emphasizing that the foreign fighters themselves do not cling to positions "if they hinder the country's interests."

Indeed, less than a day after the Trump-Shara meeting in the Saudi capital, local Syrian news agencies began reporting on raids by the General Security Directorate on headquarters belonging to foreign fighters in the Idlib countryside. Whether this action is genuine and has already begun, or merely a media stunt, it sends a clear signal about intentions.

A leader in the current Syrian army, who was a battalion commander in HTS comprising foreign fighters, says that "the government has no interest in any negative action against foreign fighters" because they enjoy strong popularity within the ranks of the new army and security forces. He adds: “Some countries have recently begun using the issue of foreign fighters as leverage against the new government. These fighters have played a crucial role since the beginning of the revolution, and their military expertise has been evident in the battles. The government is making clear efforts to remove foreign fighters from internal conflicts and return them to their positions in Idlib, with promises of integrating them into society and perhaps even granting them Syrian citizenship in the future.”

The source believes there is a significant misunderstanding surrounding this issue. American and Western demands do not include the expulsion of foreign fighters, “but rather stipulate two conditions: that they not occupy prominent positions in the nascent state, particularly in the army, security services, and government; and that none of them use Syrian territory as a platform for launching, preparing, or training for military operations abroad.” He adds: “When Hayat Tahrir al-Sham controlled Idlib for years, it committed to not allowing any faction to use Syrian territory as a platform for threats, and it kept the jihadists in check, preventing them from aspiring to cross-border operations.” He continued: “What the allies and brothers of the (Muhajireen) reject is their expulsion from the countries they fought to defend against a brutal regime, or their extradition to their home countries, where prisons and perhaps execution await them. Generally speaking, I don't believe that the leaders and fighters of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and other factions, nor the broader Islamic or revolutionary base that admires the Muhajireen jihadist model, are insistent on these individuals leading the state-building process. And I don't think that's even on the minds of the Muhajireen themselves.”

This is confirmed by Abu Hafs al-Turkistani, who currently commands a battalion in the Syrian Army (within the Ministry of Defense) whose members are mostly Uyghur Turkestan, stationed between the Idlib and Latakia countryside. He was previously a leader in the Turkestan Islamic Party. Al-Turkistani told Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, “We didn’t come to Syria to kill Syrians, nor did we come here for financial gain or positions. We only came to support them, to share their burdens and help them as much as we could. Praise be to God, victory has been achieved, and we are honored to share in it with our brothers.”

Syrian sources anticipate that foreign fighters can remain in Syria under clear, officially agreed-upon legal frameworks, in a purely civilian capacity and without taking a leading role. They would be required to pledge not to use Syrian territory to carry out their own “jihadist” plans in their home countries or elsewhere in the world, given the potentially devastating consequences. Otherwise, they can leave for a destination of their choosing.

A Syrian source close to President Ahmed al-Sharaa said that al-Sharaa wants to leave the issue of foreign fighters to the new People’s Assembly, which could pass a law granting these fighters citizenship or residency permits and jobs under certain conditions. This is to avoid embarrassment before Western and Arab countries that are demanding the removal of these fighters, as al-Sharaa relies on foreign fighters, especially those from the Turkistan Islamic Party, to protect his authority and position amidst the power struggles within his movement and among jihadist factions, particularly the extremists in Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
 
(Part one)